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The wisdom of crowds is the idea that the combination of independent estimates of the magnitude
of some quantity yields a remarkably accurate prediction, which is always more accurate than the
average individual estimate. In addition, it is largely believed that the accuracy of the crowd can be
improved by increasing the diversity of the estimates. Here we report the results of three experiments
to probe the current understanding of the wisdom of crowds, namely, the estimates of the number
of candies in a jar, the length of a paper strip, and the number of pages of a book. We find that the
collective estimate is better than the majority of the individual estimates in all three experiments.
In disagreement with the prediction diversity theorem, we find no significant correlation between the
prediction diversity and the collective error. The poor accuracy of the crowd on some experiments
lead us to conjecture that its alleged accuracy is most likely an artifice of selective attention.
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the notion of wisdom of crowds is more than
a century old, being brought to light by Galton’s 1907
seminal study of the estimation of the weight of an ox at
the West of England Fat Stock and Poultry Exhibition
in Plymouth [1] (see [2] for an historical account), it is
still a subject of fascination for the general public [3] and
for the scientific community [4] as well. This fascination
stems from the often remarkably accurate estimate given
by the mean of independent individual estimates of the
magnitude of some quantity. For instance, in the ox-
weighing contest, the crowd overestimated the weight of
the ox by less than 1% of the correct weight [1].
Explanations for the accuracy of the collective estimate
based on purely statistical arguments are not satisfac-
tory, since they assume that the individual estimates are
unbiased, that is, that the errors spread in equal propor-
tion around the correct value of the unknown quantity
[5], whereas experimental evidence, as well as common
sense, points to the existence of systematic errors on the
individual estimates [6, 7].
While the accuracy of the collective estimate remained
a sort of mystery, attention has been directed to the ob-
servation that the collective estimate is always better
than the average individual estimate. In fact, it seems
that for some researchers this is the defining character-
istic of the wisdom of crowds [8]. This observation can
be explained by a simple statistical argument, the so-
called diversity prediction theorem [4], that asserts that
the error of the collective estimate is less than or equal
to the average error of the individual estimates. Here,
average means simply the arithmetic mean of the indi-
vidual estimates. This implies that, on the average, the
collective estimate is better than the estimate of a ran-
domly selected individual in the group. This finding has
considerable practical importance as it guarantees that,
in the event one does not know who the experts are, it
is advantageous to combine the forecasts of all members
of the group. Nonetheless, the diversity prediction theo-
rem offers no clue at all on the accuracy of the collective
estimate.
However, as hinted by its name, the diversity predic-
tion theorem seems also to have a say in the role of
the diversity of the individual estimates, the so-called
prediction diversity. In fact, since the theorem asserts
that the (quadratic) collective error equals the average
(quadratic) individual error minus the diversity of the
estimates, one is tempted to think that the increase of
the prediction diversity would improve the collective es-
timate [4, 8]. Unfortunately, this result, which reflects
somewhat the zeitgeist of the 21st century, does not fol-
low from the diversity prediction theorem since the aver-
age individual error and the diversity of the estimates are
not independent quantities, that is, an increase of the pre-
diction diversity may change the average individual error
with unpredictable effects on the collective error. Never-
theless, unveiling the influence of the prediction diversity
on the accuracy of the collective estimate is clearly a cru-
cial issue for the understanding of the wisdom of crowds.
Accordingly, in this paper we report the results of three
experiments to probe the wisdom of crowds phenomenon,
namely, the classic estimate of the number of candies in
a jar, the estimate of the length of a paper strip, and the
estimate of the number of pages of a book. The number
of estimates in each experiment were over one hundred.
To measure the correlation between the prediction diver-
sity and the collective error we produced a large num-
ber of virtual experiments by selecting N estimates at
random and without replacement from the original en-
semble of estimates of the real experiments. We find
no significant correlation between the prediction diver-
sity and the collective error, thus implying that diversity
has no predictive value for the accuracy of the collec-
tive estimate. Most interestingly, for the candies-in-a-jar
and the pages-of-a-book experiments, where the collec-
tive estimates grossly missed the correct value, there is
an optimal group size that maximizes the chances of high-
accuracy collective predictions, similarly to the findings
on distributed cooperative problem solving systems [9].
However, for the paper strip experiment, where the col-
lective estimate was already very accurate, the chances
of high-accuracy collective predictions (i.e., predictions
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2that miss the correct value by less than 5%) increase
monotonically with the group size N .
Regarding the accuracy of the collective estimate, our
experiments support the view of systematic errors on the
collective forecast [6, 7], which depend on the skills of
the subjects on the proposed tasks. For example, in
the paper strip experiment the crowd underestimated the
length by 1.8% only, whereas in the pages-of-a-book ex-
periment the underestimate was of 28.4%. Our conclu-
sion is that the high accuracy of the wisdom of crowds,
which is responsible for its popularity among the general
public, is an illusion resulting from selective attention
that gives prominence to the successful outcomes only.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion II we present a brief review of the diversity prediction
theorem [4] and introduce the basic quantities used to
characterize the wisdom of crowds experiments. In Sec-
tion III we describe and analyze the results of our three
experiments, emphasizing the influence of the prediction
diversity on the accuracy of the collective estimate. Fi-
nally, in Section IV we summarize our results and present
our concluding remarks.
II. PAGE’S DIVERSITY PREDICTION
THEOREM
The diversity prediction theorem [4] is considered a
main attainment to those that celebrate the power of di-
versity to improve the performance of groups [8] (see,
however, [10]), since it shows that the (quadratic) col-
lective error can be related in a very simple manner to
the average (quadratic) individual error and to a mea-
sure of the diversity of the estimates. More pointedly,
let gi be the estimate of some unknown quantity, such
as the weight of the ox in Galton’s experiment, by indi-
vidual i = 1, . . . , N . We will consider the gis as random
variables that, as far as the diversity prediction theorem
concerns, need not be independent. In addition, let G be
the true value of the unknown quantity the N individuals
are trying to estimate and the collective estimate be de-
fined as the arithmetic mean of the individual estimates,
that is, 〈g〉 = ∑Ni=1 gi/N . (We note that Galton used
the median of the individual estimates as the collective
estimate in the ox-weighing experiment [1], though the
arithmetic mean proved to be a better estimator in that
case [2].) Thus, the quadratic collective error is defined
as
γ = (〈g〉 −G)2 . (1)
Next we define the average quadratic individual error,
 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(gi −G)2 , (2)
and the diversity of the estimates,
δ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(gi − 〈g〉)2 , (3)
so that the identity
γ = − δ (4)
follows straightforwardly. This identity is Page’s
diversity prediction theorem, which asserts that
the (quadratic) collective error equals the average
(quadratic) individual error minus the prediction diver-
sity. This result is sometimes interpreted as the proof
that increasing the prediction diversity δ results in the
decrease of the collective error γ [8]. Of course, since δ
and  cannot be varied independently of each other, this
interpretation is not correct.
In fact, the discussion on the value of Page’s diver-
sity prediction theorem is reminiscent of the arguments
about the relevance of the celebrated Price equation [11]
for evolutionary biology. We note that Price’s equation,
which has a straightforward derivation from the defini-
tion of fitness, is considered by many researchers as a
mere mathematical tautology [12].
Here we take a pragmatic stance and carry out exper-
iments to check whether the increase of the diversity of
the estimates is likely to result in a decrease of the collec-
tive error, without entering into the merit of the diversity
prediction theorem. It is interesting to note that the di-
versity of estimates δ is known in the statistical literature
as the precision of the estimates, that is, the closeness of
repeated estimates (of the same quantity) to one another
[13]. The experiments and the analyses of their results
are the subjects of the next section.
III. EXPERIMENTS
We have carried out three experiments in which a
number of STEM (science, technology, engineering, and
mathematics) students of the University of Sa˜o Paulo
guessed independently the number of candies in a jar,
the length of a paper strip and the number of pages of a
book.
A. Estimating the number of candies in a jar
This is a classic wisdom of crowds experiment [3] in
which the individuals have to guess independently the
number of candies in a jar (see [14] for a variant with
non-independent guesses) resulting, typically, in a group
estimate superior to the vast majority of the individual
guesses [8]. In particular, 105 students guessed the num-
ber of candies in a transparent jar that held G = 636
candies. The group estimate 〈g〉 = 531 was better than
70% of the individual estimates. In our setup, there was
no penalty for the guess farthest from the correct answer
and the reward for the best guess (630, in our case) was
the jar of candies.
Figure 1 shows the histogram of the normalized guesses
gi/〈g〉 which we attempted to fit using a two-pieces nor-
mal distribution of mean 1 (see, e.g., [15]). Notice that
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FIG. 1. Histogram of the normalized estimates x = gi/〈g〉 for
the candies-in-a-jar experiment. The vertical line indicates
the ratio between the correct number of candies G = 636 and
the estimate of the group 〈g〉 = 531, that is, G/〈g〉 ≈ 1.2.
The solid curve is the best fitting (R2 = 0.77) two-pieces nor-
mal distribution Ae−(x−µ)
2/2σ21 if x < µ and Ae−(x−µ)
2/2σ22
otherwise, where A =
[√
2pi (σ1 + σ2) /2
]−1
with σ1 = 0.12,
σ2 = 0.66. and µ = 1 − (σ2 − σ1)
√
2/pi ≈ 0.565 so that the
mean of the fitting distribution equals 1.
the most probable estimate is about half of the correct
number of candies in the jar. The asymmetry of the
distribution of estimates is quite noticeable and is con-
firmed by the positive value of the moment coefficient of
skewness µ˜3 = 0.73. This means that the odds of gross
overestimation of the outcome are much greater than of
underestimation due to the right-tailed nature of the dis-
tribution. It is interesting that Galton’s ox-weighing ex-
periment results in a left-skewed, left-tailed distribution
of estimates [2]. In fact, in order to tackle the asymmetry
of the distribution, Galton suggested the use of two nor-
mal distributions to fit the lower and the upper halves of
the histogram of estimates, hence our choice of the two-
pieces normal distribution as the fitting distribution in
Figure 1.
Since for a single experiment, we cannot drawn any
conclusion about the influence of the diversity of the es-
timates δ on the collective error γ, here we use the esti-
mates of the candies-in-a-jar experiment to generate 104
virtual experiments. In each experiment, N estimates
are drawn at random without replacement from the 105
original estimates. For each experiment, γ and δ are eval-
uated so we can draw the scatter plots shown in Figure 2.
In particular, this figure shows the relative collective er-
ror γ1/2/G and the relative diversity δ1/2/〈g〉 for each one
of the 104 experiments for groups of size N = 10, 20, 40
and 60. We note that the mean 〈g〉 depends on the par-
ticular experiment considered, so it assumes a different
value for each point in the scatter plots. In terms of these
dimensionless quantities, equation (4) is rewriten as
γ
G2
=

G2
− δ〈g〉2
〈g〉2
G2
, (5)
which preserves the main points of the diversity predic-
tion theorem, namely, the correct claim that γ1/2/G ≥
1/2/G and the incorrect inference that the increase of
the relative diversity δ1/2/〈g〉 implies a decrease of the
relative collective error γ1/2/G. We hasten to note that
although, in principle, these two quantities might be neg-
atively correlated, this result does not follow from equa-
tion (5) since the increase of δ may result in a decrease
of  and 〈g〉.
The Pearson correlation coefficients between δ1/2/〈g〉
and γ1/2/G are r = −0.005 for N = 10, r = 0.04 for
N = 20, r = 0.06 for N = 40 and r = 0.07 for N = 60
so it is safe to state that the diversity of the estimates
conveys very little, if any, information on the accuracy of
the group estimate. We note that the center of mass of
the data shown in the panels of Figure 2 are at δ1/2/〈g〉 =
0.416 and γ1/2/G = 0.165 regardless of the value of N .
Of course, these values coincide with those calculated
using the original sample of 105 estimates.
An interesting result revealed in Figure 2 is that the
probability that the percent error of the group estimate is
less than 5%, which is given by the fraction of data points
that fall within the horizontal band in the scatter plot,
depends on the group size N . To quantify this effect,
we present in Figure 3 this probability as function of the
group size. These startling results reveal the existence
of an optimal group size (N = 5) that maximizes the
odds of producing a high accuracy estimate of the number
of candies in the jar. In order words, picking N = 5
estimates at random out of the 105 original ones yields
a 14% chance of producing a group estimate that misses
the correct value by less than 5%. In addition, selection
of a single estimate at random is more likely to result
in such high accuracy estimates than the aggregation of
N ≥ 20 estimates. The chance of such a precise estimate
vanishes like e−βN
2
with β > 0 for increasing N . This
is so because the percent collective error of the original
sample of 105 estimates, namely, 16.5%, does not tally
with our definition of high accuracy estimate.
B. Estimating the length of a paper strip
Whereas the competence of the students to estimate
the number of candies in a jar is very problematical, as
our experiment was their first experience on that task,
we expect them to be better skilled to size up the length
of a paper strip. Accordingly, we asked 139 students to
guess the length of a paper strip that measured G =
22.4 cm. The group estimate 〈g〉 = 22.0 cm was better
than 85% of the individual estimates and corresponds to
a percent error of only 1.8%. The best guess was 22.5 cm.
There was no reward or penalty for the subjects in this
experiment.
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FIG. 2. Scatter plots of the candies-in-a-jar experiment for groups of size a: N = 10, b: N = 20, c: N = 40, d: N = 60. The
x-axis is the relative standard deviation of the estimates δ1/2/〈g〉, which measures the diversity of the estimates, whereas the
y-axis is the relative collective error γ1/2/G, which measures the accuracy of the group estimate. The horizontal band at the
bottom of the panels indicate the regions where the percent error of the group estimate is less than 5%.
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FIG. 3. Probability that the percent collective error is less
than 5% for the candies-in-a-jar experiment as function of the
group size N . The solid curve is the fitting function αe−βN
2
for the large N regime. The fitting parameters are α = 0.12
and β = 0.0021.
The histogram of the normalized guesses x = gi/〈g〉 for
the paper strip experiment is shown in Figure 4 together
with a best fitting Gaussian distribution. The symmetry
of the estimates around the mean and their small vari-
ance attest the skill of the students to size up ordinary
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FIG. 4. Histogram of the normalized estimates x = gi/〈g〉
for the paper strip experiment. The vertical line indicates
the ratio between the length of the paper strip G = 22.4 cm
and the estimate of the group 〈g〉 = 22.0 cm, that is, G/〈g〉 ≈
1.018. The solid curve is the best fitting (R2 = 0.94) Gaussian
distribution e−(x−1)
2/2σ2/
√
2piσ2 with σ2 = 0.012 and mean
1.
lengths. Although the noticeable asymmetry of the his-
togram of estimates for the candies-in-a-jar experiment
leads us to follow Galton’s suggestion and use a two-
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FIG. 5. Scatter plots of the paper strip experiment for groups of size a: N = 10, b: N = 20, c: N = 40, d: N = 60. The x-axis
is the relative standard deviation of the estimates δ1/2/〈g〉, which measures the diversity of the estimates, whereas the y-axis
is relative collective error γ1/2/G. which measures the accuracy of the group estimate. The horizontal band at the bottom of
the panels indicate the regions where the percent error of the group estimate is less than 5%.
pieces normal distribution as the fitting distribution (see
Figure 1), a normal distribution seems way more suitable
to fit the almost symmetric histogram of the paper strip
experiment.
The scatter plots of Figure 5 that show the properly
normalized diversity of the estimates and the relative col-
lective error for distinct group sizes reveal no meaning-
ful correlation between these quantities. More pointedly,
the Pearson correlation coefficients between δ1/2/〈g〉 and
γ1/2/G are r = 0.28 for N = 10, r = 0.11 for N = 20,
r = −0.049 for N = 40 and r = −0.11 for N = 60. We
note that the claim that high prediction diversity leads
or, more precisely, is associated to lower collective errors
should be supported by a large negative correlation be-
tween δ1/2/〈g〉 and γ1/2/G. Although this correlation
becomes more negative as N increases, it is too low to
offer useful information on the wisdom of crowds puzzle.
The center of mass of the data shown in the panels of Fig-
ure 5 are at δ1/2/〈g〉 = 0.16 and γ1/2/G = 0.018 regard-
less of the value of N . The fraction of group estimates
whose percent error is less than 5% shown in Figure 6
contrasts starkly with the results for the candies-in-a-jar
experiment (see Figure 3) as now the group accuracy in-
creases with increasing N . In addition, there is a 30%
chance that a randomly selected estimate yields a pre-
diction within the 5% accuracy range, which certifies the
competence of the students to gauge lengths.
The stark difference between Figures 3 and 6 is some-
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80
Pr
ob
 ( γ
1/
2 /G
  <
 0
.0
5)
N
FIG. 6. Probability that the percent collective error is less
than 5% for the paper strip experiment as function of the
group size N .
what reminiscent of Condorcet’s jury theorem (see, e.g.,
[16]) in the sense that adding more voters (i.e., increas-
ing the number of estimates N) may either improve or
degrade the collective performance, depending on some
circumstances. In Condorcet’s theorem, it is the prob-
ability that an individual votes for the correct decision
that determines whether a single voter or a jury will max-
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FIG. 7. Histogram of the normalized estimates x = gi/〈g〉 for
the pages-of-a-book experiment. The vertical line indicates
the ratio between the correct number of pages G = 784 and
the estimate of the group 〈g〉 = 561, that is, G/〈g〉 ≈ 1.4.
The solid curve is the best fitting (R2 = 0.84) two-pieces nor-
mal distribution Ae−(x−µ)
2/2σ21 if x < µ and Ae−(x−µ)
2/2σ22
otherwise, where A =
[√
2pi (σ1 + σ2) /2
]−1
with σ1 = 0.09,
σ2 = 0.49. and µ = 1 − (σ2 − σ1)
√
2/pi ≈ 0.682 so that the
mean of the fitting distribution equals 1.
imize the probability of making the correct decision. In
our case, this role is played by the percent error of the col-
lective estimate: if it is too large, our results indicate that
discarding individual estimates at random will increase
the probability of producing a high accuracy collective
estimate.
C. Estimating the number of pages of a book
The same 139 students, who were asked to estimate
the length of the paper strip, estimated also the number
of pages of a book of G = 784 pages. As in the previous
experiment, there was no reward or penalty for the sub-
jects. We recall that those students were very accurate on
their estimates of the length of a paper strip (see Figure
4). Surprisingly, their collective estimate of the number
of pages of the book was kind of disastrous: 〈g〉 = 561,
which was superior to only 63% of the individual esti-
mates and corresponds to a percent error of 28.4%. The
best guess was 800 pages that corresponds to a percent
error of only 2%.
Figure 7 shows the histogram of the normalized guesses
gi/〈g〉 which, following Galton’s original hunch, we at-
tempted to fit using a two-pieces normal distribution of
mean 1. The histogram exhibits a considerable asymme-
try that is measured by the moment coefficient of skew-
ness µ˜3 = 1.22. The analysis of the prediction power
of random assembled combinations of N estimates yields
results qualitatively similar to those of the candies-in-a-
jar experiment. In particular, the scaled collective error
is γ1/2/G = 0.28 and the scaled prediction diversity is
δ1/2/〈g〉 = 0.36. The pages-of-a-book experiment is an
excellent illustration of the largely unsung but funda-
mental fact that the collective estimate may not produce
accurate predictions.
IV. DISCUSSION
The belief that cooperation can aid a group of agents
to solve problems more efficiently than if those agents
worked in isolation is a commonplace [17–19], although
the factors that make cooperation effective still need
much straightening out [20]. In fact, this is the main issue
addressed by the research on distributed cooperative or
parallel problem solving systems [21], since cooperation
may well lead the group astray resulting in the so-called
madness of crowds as neatly expressed by MacKay almost
two centuries ago: “Men, it has been well said, think in
herds; it will be seen that they go mad in herds, while
they only recover their senses slowly, and one by one.”
[22].
However, the notion that a collection of independently
deciding individuals is likely to predict better than indi-
viduals or even experts within the group – a phenomenon
dubbed wisdom of crowds [3] – is much more controver-
sial. The first report of this phenomenon in the literature
was probably Galton’s account of the surprisingly accu-
rate estimate of the weight of an ox given by the median
of the sample of the individual guesses [1]. Although
much of the evidence of the wisdom of crowds is anec-
dotal (see, e.g., [3]), there are a few efforts aiming at
explaining this phenomenon either using a purely statis-
tical framework [4] or using psychological arguments on
the nature of the individual estimates [6, 7].
The main difficulty to approach the wisdom of crowds
phenomenon in a non-contentious manner is that it seems
to have distinct meanings for different researchers. For
instance, some researchers view it as the idea that a
crowd can solve problems better than most individuals
in it, including experts [8]. We note, however, that this
is not what Page’s diversity prediction theorem asserts.
In fact, equation (4) asserts that γ ≥ , where γ is the
quadratic collective error and  is the average quadratic
individual error, which equals the expected error of the
estimate of a randomly selected individual in the group.
Hence, the theorem offers no guarantee that the collec-
tive estimate will be better than the estimates of most
individuals in the group. Nevertheless, for the pages-of-
a-book experiment we find that the collective estimate is
better than 63% of the individual estimates, whereas this
figure increases to 85% for the paper strip experiment.
We note that the specification ‘including experts’ in the
above definition is misleading because one may be led to
believe incorrectly that the collective estimate is better
than the experts’. For example, even in the paper strip
experiment for which the collective estimate was highly
accurate, it was outperformed by 15% of the individual
7estimates.
At this stage we should note that our disagreement
over Page’s diversity prediction theorem γ =  − δ (see
equation (4)), or, more correctly, over the interpretation
of that theorem, since its proof is straightforward, is that
one cannot infer how a change on the diversity of the
estimates δ will influence the collective error γ, because
the mean individual error  will also be affected by that
change. Nevertheless, the effect of δ on γ is an important
issue that can be addressed empirically. Since it is not
feasible to carry out many independent experiments to
calculate the correlation between these quantities, here
we produced those experiments artificially by selecting N
estimates at random and without replacement from the
original set of estimates of our experiments. Our results
(see Figures 2 and 5) indicate that there is no significant
correlation between γ and δ, that is, diversity has no
predictive value at all for the accuracy of the collective
estimate.
We think the reason the phenomenon of the wisdom of
crowds caught on has little to do with the fact that on the
average the collective estimate improves upon randomly
chosen individual estimates, which can actually be quite
poor as illustrated by our pages-of-a-book experiment.
For many researchers (see, e.g., [7]), the real riddle is
the surprisingly good accuracy of the collective estimate
that, in Galton’s seminal experiment, missed the correct
weight by 0.8% only [1]. A possible explanation involves
the combination of forecasts [5] which, on the condition
that the individual forecasts are unbiased, guarantees
that the accuracy of the combined estimation increases
as the number of independent estimates increases. The
trouble with this approach is the implausibility of the
assumption that the individual estimates are unbiased,
that is, that their means coincide with the correct value
of the quantity being estimate. (It is interesting that the
assumption of unbiased individual estimates means that
one could harvest the benefits of the wisdom of crowds
by asking a single individual to make several estimates
at different times [23].) On the contrary, there seems to
be a systematic error in the wisdom of crowds so that
the collective estimate depends on some typical, group-
dependent belief on the value of the unknown quantity
[6, 7]. Since this typical value may be quite apart from
the correct value, there is no guarantee of the accuracy of
the collective estimate, which is precisely the conclusion
we draw from the experiments reported here. Hence, the
high accuracy of the collective estimate, which gives the
wisdom of crowds its popular appeal, is most likely an
artifice of selective attention or cherry picking that gives
prominence to the successful outcomes only.
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